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“Auditor Independence”
By Bishop C. Hunt
As an economist who has pursued some interest in the develop­
ment of English company organization and control, I venture to 
comment on several matters discussed in a recent article in The 
Journal of Accountancy by A. C. Littleton entitled “Auditor 
Independence.” In the first place, I think his views of English 
practice are mistaken. Secondly, while I have no doubt that he 
has the best interests of the profession at heart, I am convinced 
that his proposals for the organization of audit practice and prac­
titioners are unsound, not only from the point of view of the 
progressive development of accountancy in this country, but as 
well, from that of the security of shareholders for which we are all 
solicitous. If adopted, they would, in my judgment, bind ac­
countancy in the fetters of an inevitably mediocre bureaucracy.
It will be worth while to take a brief glance at the evolution of 
the English law in the matter. “ Periodical accounts,” Gladstone 
declared in 1844, “if honestly made and fairly audited can not 
fail to excite attention to the real state of [a] concern.” In ac­
cordance with this view, all joint-stock companies formed under 
the registration and regulation act of that year, were required, 
as a prerequisite of legal sanction to do business, to appoint 
auditors “to receive and examine the accounts.” Directors were 
to cause “A full and fair balance-sheet to be made up” and to 
approve it before delivery to auditors. Similar provisions were 
included in the act of 1845 to govern companies established by 
special act of parliament. Auditors, it is interesting to note in 
passing, were empowered to employ the assistance of professional 
accountants. The compulsory requirement of audit was dropped 
in the effective general statutes for the incorporation of com­
panies with limited liability, those of 1856 and 1862. However, 
the provision was retained in the model (and optional) constitu­
tion for such companies, set up in table A of the act of 1862 and 
probably adopted by a majority of concerns. Compulsory and 
independent audit for banks was legislated in 1879. Under the 
combined influence of a growing complexity of accounts and fear 
of penalties, practice gradually substituted the professional for 
the lay auditor so that by the act of 1900, under which the ap- 
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pointment of auditors became compulsory for all companies, the 
accounts of most of them were not only audited but were in fact 
audited by chartered accountants (cf. The Accountant, Vol. XXVI 
[1900], p. 475). Indeed, practice has generally outrun legal 
minima. The stiffening of requirements over the years has, in 
fact, merely translated into statute the best of the current pro­
fessional practice.
Undoubtedly, the most important characteristic of English 
company law and practice today is the position of the auditor. 
With relation both to shareholders and to directors, he occupies 
an independent status. Appointed by the annual general meet­
ing of shareholders, he may be neither an officer nor a director of 
the company nor an employee of any director or officer. He may 
not be indemnified by the articles of a company for negligence or 
breach of trust. He is liable to proceedings for misfeasance, in 
the same fashion as directors. He is entitled to attend and to 
address any general meeting of shareholders before which ac­
counts are to be laid. It is also to be mentioned that the board 
of trade may appoint inspectors to investigate the affairs of any 
company upon the application of members holding 10 per cent 
of the shares issued, if it is supported by evidence showing good 
reason and the absence of "malicious motives.”
The lack of auditor independence in England which Mr. Little­
ton alleges, and in which he seems to find an important argument 
for the nationalization of the profession in our own country, will 
be found on adequate acquaintance with the facts of English 
business life to be insignificant. In the first place, an auditor is 
obliged by law to state in his certificate whether directors have 
satisfied his requirements as to information. If they had not, it 
is fair to say, I think, that in the great majority of cases he would 
refuse to certify. At least seven days in advance of the general 
meeting before which they are to be laid, a copy of the balance- 
sheet and auditors’ report must be sent to all shareholders en­
titled to attend. To put it mildly, directors would be under some 
embarrassment if they had to confront such a meeting of English 
shareholders without their auditor’s certificate, to say nothing of 
the effect upon the company’s credit. As already pointed out, 
auditors may, as of right, attend and address the general meeting 
before which accounts are laid. In other words, they have a right 
to be heard before being dropped. Furthermore, in view of the 
exacting standards of professional ethics among members of the 
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great societies of accountants, it would be difficult, to say the 
least, to fill the places of auditors who had retired on the score of 
pressure from directors to slight their duties, and such pressure 
would in the vast majority of cases lead to resignation. No firm 
of any reputation would consider appointment in the room of 
others without consultation first on the circumstances of with­
drawal or dismissal with those who had retired. The existence of 
a high degree of professional comity in such matters is not to be 
overlooked. Moreover, it does not embroider the facts to say 
that the accounts of the great majority of the large public com­
panies—those which appeal to the market for capital and whose 
incidents of ownership are widely diffused—are audited by ac­
countants of high calibre. Despite the circumstance, then, that 
directors in office may in some cases dominate a meeting of share­
holders and so nominate auditors indirectly, the general standards 
of the profession are a sufficient realistic safeguard of auditor 
independence.
While auditor independence is not, therefore, an issue in Eng­
lish company regulation, the requirements as to disclosure of 
accounting results are admittedly inadequate, and practice in 
this matter both as to form and content suffers by comparison 
with the best which prevails in the United States. Although the 
reforms of 1928 were a considerable advance, they left serious 
lacunae. Much information, the publication of which the law 
might reasonably require, remains cloaked in “Victorian gar­
ments of secrecy.” Published accounts are indeed often “a 
model of obscurity” (see my article in Harvard Business Review, 
January, 1930). Forward-looking accountants (and others) are 
convinced that the requirements as to publicity should be broad­
ened, for unfortunately the irreducible minima prescribed by law 
become maxima in practice. However, as far as the prerogatives 
of the auditor are concerned, it must be remembered that “the 
responsibility for public accounts lies with the directors . . . 
and so long as the accounts comply with the minimum legal 
standard of disclosure the auditor has no official power whatever 
to interfere with the discretion of the board” (cf. The Accountant, 
April 16, 1932).
Mr. Littleton, further, argues from circumscription of auditors’ 
duties by the English courts. In view of the fact that legislative 
prescription of those duties, beyond a generalization that they 
shall report whether or not the balance-sheet “is properly drawn 
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up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the com­
pany’s affairs,” whatever that may be, is conspicuously absent 
from the statute book, it is fair to inquire what guide-posts have 
emerged from litigation. A classic dictum reads: “It is the duty 
of an auditor to bring to bear on the work he has to perform that 
skill, care and caution which a reasonably competent, careful and 
cautious auditor would use. What is reasonable care, skill and 
caution must depend upon the particular circumstances of each 
case. An auditor is not bound to be a detective, ... to ap­
proach his work with suspicion or with a foregone conclusion that 
there is something wrong. He is a watch dog, but not a blood­
hound” (Re Kingston Cotton Mill Co.). This, it would seem, is 
broad enough to catch within its net a multitude of sins and yet 
not place impossible burdens upon the profession. (For a recent 
case of misfeasance which cost an auditor upwards of £8,000, see 
in re Fulton & Co., [1932]). But perhaps the decision in re London 
General Bank is in the minds of the authors whom Mr. Littleton 
cites. From that case we have it that “it is no part of an audi­
tor’s duty to give advice either to directors or shareholders as to 
what they ought to do”; he has nothing to do with the way in 
which the business is carried on. While I would not like to ex­
press agreement with all the implications involved, I do think that 
this decision points to the essential, if sometimes forgotten, fact 
that the accounts of a company are the accounts of directors and 
that the primary responsibility for them is theirs, a responsibility, 
moreover, that should in no circumstances be weakened or shifted 
to auditors. Let us be reminded of the original meaning of the 
word audit: “the hearing of explanations from the person render­
ing the account.”
The legislature has in fact always refused a detailed or “cast- 
iron statutory” definition of auditors’ powers and duties. De­
spite urging from various quarters, the most recent committee on 
company law reform (1925-26) again declined to recommend such, 
holding it better that “the law should retain its elasticity in this 
respect than that an attempt should be made to confine it within 
the bounds of a rigid formula.” Wisdom and experience are 
embodied in this view. As it was argued before the committee, 
“a list of duties always leaves something in the air . . . the 
auditor might say, ‘ That is not in the statute, therefore I do not 
propose to do it.’ . . . The cases vary so enormously that what 
is applicable in one is not applicable in another.” Or, as a presi­
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dent of the Institute of Chartered Accountants (H. L. H. Hill) 
has since observed: “I believe that the time will never come when 
legislation can be so definite and comprehensive that auditors 
will be reduced to mere automata, to obey audit programmes laid 
down by statute. The whole value of our work is dependent 
upon our proper exercise of judgment” (The Accountant, January 
9, 1932). “In our professional life proper conduct has not been 
brought about and can not be brought about by legislation” 
(The Accountant, May 7, 1932). It is also of interest to mention 
that a committee of the board of trade on the registration of 
accountants refused, in 1930, to recommend such registration, in 
spite of the fact that the companies’ acts do not require auditors 
of public companies to have any special qualifications. The 
committee found no evidence to show that any useful purpose 
would be served.
Mr. Littleton finds a necessity for an “American plan to fit 
American conditions.” It strikes an American as peculiarly odd 
that he should overlook the admirably poised, if not altogether 
infallible, system of checks and balances which inheres in English 
audit practice, not to mention its happy characteristics of elas­
ticity and freedom for the exercise of that judgment so necessary 
in the practice of public accounting. Strangely, he offers in 
alternative a proposal for the regimentation of the profession 
and practice from which, so far as I can see, anything in the nature 
of check and balance is conspicuously absent—a scheme fraught 
with danger from several points of view, not the least of which is 
that it would be apt to create in the minds of directors and in­
vestors “the feeling that the state is the chief mentor of the one 
and the guardian of the other.” Under his plan, all statements 
submitted to the securities commission are to be certified only by 
licensed auditors whose tenure is subject only to a governmental 
board of review charged with the responsibility of their appoint­
ment and discipline, of defining their duties, and, as well, em­
powered to adjudicate and officially to pronounce upon con­
troverted questions of accounting theory and practice. Such a 
board, it is argued, would under the afflatus of high position, 
plus a not inconsiderable lure of fat pensions, draw to its member­
ship personnel of the highest calibre professionally and of utter 
devotion to the common weal.
In the first place, is it presumptuous to inquire what there is in 
the past experience of our country, or in the visible future, which 
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would guaranty that appointments to (or under) such a commis­
sion would be free from political interference (what, then, of that 
independence so desirable in an auditor?), or that it would attract 
the best of our accounting intelligence? It would seem that 
there is only one answer: an emphatic “No.” Next, in the case 
of controversy between a corporation and licensed auditors (and 
what possibilities thereof!), the dice seem to be loaded in favor of 
the latter and of the particular views of the board. In common 
matters of accounting policy, there is more often than not room 
for a legitimate and, indeed, wide diversity of opinions—any one 
of which could perhaps be reasonably supported. A company 
might be forced to accept a decision from Washington against its 
own best judgment and that of its accounting advisors. Can it 
be maintained seriously that holy writ in a matter such as ob­
solescence, for example, sanctified as administrative law by such a 
body, would necessarily be the part of wisdom? There is in 
accounting, peculiarly, a broad area of “scientific guesswork.” 
It is preposterous to suppose either that the responsibility there­
for can be shifted to the shoulders of civil servants or that by so 
doing that area can be narrowed. Nor by attempting to do so 
should investors be misled into thinking that it either can be or is 
being done. And, even in routine matters of audit, I venture to 
doubt whether an auditor labelled with the magic word “licensed ” 
could attain superior results from their point of view.
No doubt under English practice when differences arise between 
directors and auditors, the directors may in some cases exercise 
considerable pressure to bring about acceptance of their views by 
the auditors (see, for example, Minutes of evidence, company law 
amendment committee [1926], QQ. 520; 3617-19). And, if the 
directors are forceful, and not wholly wrong, and the auditors are 
somewhat compliant, the results may be—indeed in some cases 
clearly have been—prejudicial to the interests of the stockholders. 
But this is merely to say that the system does not function per­
fectly; and admitting this to be a fact, it is reasonably certain that 
discussion between two parties, each possessing special experience 
and each vested with definite powers and responsibilities, will, by 
and large, produce better results than a bureaucratic control 
which in actual practice is apt to be exercised by persons of less 
competence, acting with less sense of personal responsibility.
May I quote in conclusion, and in illustration of what I believe 
to be the sound point of view in this whole matter a remark made 
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a decade ago by Sir Josiah Stamp? It is well known that his dis­
tinction is by no means confined to his own profession. “I 
think,” he said, “accountancy will grow more by modifying con­
ventions than by force of law.” As a recent example of this line 
of advance, one may mention the form of auditors’ report, etc., 
developed as a result of cooperation between the American In­
stitute of Accountants and the authorities of the stock exchange. 
It called forth the following comment from the other side of the 
Atlantic:
“ It is interesting to reflect that this result has been achieved by 
cooperation between the expert interests affected, and that it has 
not been necessary to invoke legislative sanction. It seems nat­
ural to expect that the parties who have contributed to this 
happy agreement will do their utmost to secure that American 
business units and the American investing public shall under­
stand the general nature of an audit and its inevitable limitations. 
We rather envy our American cousins, too, on the score that the 
cooperation which has resulted in the agreement can be used 
advantageously if it should later appear that some amendment is 
required. In that event, no such cumbersome machinery as par­
liamentary action need to be invoked; the parties will again 
confer, and if they again display the qualities of wise statesman­
ship which their present action has revealed, they are likely to 
have no difficulty in amending the result of their present labours” 
(The Accountant, May 19, 1934).
The profession in this country is under challenge to resist any 
attempt to have its freedom of development arrested, or its hands 
shackled, in the course of the overemphasis on the prerogatives of 
government which characterizes the hour.
459
